Citizens should require that an appellate court must only uphold a criminal conviction if the court agrees unanimously. Also, citizens should impeach any judge or justice who usurps a jury’s constitutional authority.
(A) Appealing the Tyranny of Judicial Majorities;
(B) Bad Judges as Ersatz Juries.
(A) Appealing the Tyranny of Judicial Majorities
Injudicious jurists—these blasé bookworm lawyers and judges—have addicted themselves to procedure at the expense of justice. See, e.g. State v. Larson, 582 N.W.2d (1998) (blithely stepping over the several doubts of the dissenter, Justice Amundson—including that the majority wrongly condemned the accused by “confus[ing] recklessness with ordinary negligence” (quotation omitted). As a matter of procedure, appellate decisions are, whenever necessary, just a tyranny of the majority. But if a lone juror’s dissent can and does—and should—”hang” a jury, i.e. acquit the accused: how much more should a lone judge’s or justice’s dissent hang the call to hang a man. Any decent, reasonable, informed person recognizes how justice requires that affirming a criminal conviction on appeal must arise only by a unanimous appellate court.
(B) Bad Judges as Ersatz Juries
In U.S. law, judicial narcissists among many mini-monarchies have recklessly invented “reasonable doubt”—and grafted that groundless, indefensible standard onto a social contract which says plainly that the trial of all crimes, except impeachments, must be by jury. See U.S. Const. art. 3, sect. 2. Yet by the unconstitutional invention of “reasonable doubt,” traitors inside the judiaciary—but far outside the constitution—reserve a wrong to usurp the authority of a jury. Any decent, reasonable, informed person recognizes that any doubt is a “reasonable doubt”—when held by the Constitution’s chosen authorities: jurors.
Justice in U.S. law currently requires no less than two changes:
(1) that affirming a criminal conviction must require a unanimous appellate court, not just a preponderance of opinions.
(2) the rejection of the “reasonble doubt” standard, which serves—above all—to destroy juries’ constitutal authority.